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JURISDICTION AND CONTROL OVER THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: DE MAXIMIS NON
CURAT LEX.
By J.

SHAND WATSON*

The current flurry in the legal literature caused by multinational enterprises is yet another indication that the existing systems of control in the
domestic and international spheres are either stretched to their limits or
else completely inadequate to their assigned tasks. Most writers indicate
that the multinational enterprise (MNE),' however defined, is a strong
force for good or evil and, consequently, must be subject to some degree of
control; yet when that conclusion is discussed, the schools of thought that
emerge are as numerous as the commentators. 2 This article does not endeavor to provide answers to the current fetish, but is aimed rather at
putting it in the context of the continuing problems of transnational and
international law, namely, the lack of a valid and efficacious international
jurisdiction and the inevitable friction resulting from overeager attempts
by nation-states to solve the problem by means of extraterritorial enforcement of domestic norms of behavior.
At the outset as always, is the definitional problem, for an MNE may
take many forms and its definition will depend heavily on the teleology of
the discipline in which the definition is to be used. A legal definition here,
as opposed to a managerial or economic one, is more difficult than usual
to establish due to the fact that internationally at least the MNE is operating in a legal vacuum, being entirely dependent upon the corporation laws
of the various countries within which it operates. Thus the legal system
which ought to supply a definition cannot. On the other hand, if one looks
to the domestic legal systems of the home and host countries, one will find
that the divergencies between the meanings of the legal concepts used in
each system alone would preclude any attempt at a detailed legal definition. Likewise, the legal apparatus available is of such scope that generalties are all that one may hope for; as an example, foreign investment may
be conducted by means of everything from branches and wholly-owned
* Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Edinburgh University, Scotland (LL.B., 1969); University of Illinois (LL.M., 1972).
1. In view of the fact that most such bodies utilise in their strategy a large number of
subsidiary corporations under central managerial control, it would be confusing to use the
term "multinational corporation" to describe them. Hence the use of the term "multinational
enterprise" (MNE).
2. See, e.g., S. ROLFE AND W. DAMM, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (1970); C. KINDLEBERGER, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION (1970); Goldberg and
Kindleberger, Towards a GATT for Investment: A Proposalfor Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW AND POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 295 (1970); Rubin, MultinationalEnter-

prise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 L. AND POL. INT'L Bus. 1 (1971).
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subsidiaries to joint ventures and contractual relationships.3 In regard to
the managerial concept of the MNE, there is a similar breadth available
as shown by a comparison of Sperry Rand and IBM World Trade Corporation.' The former has been organized into "internationally oriented product divisions" 5 which tend to create relatively independent management
of given products on a global scale, whereas the latter operates on the basis
of complete product integration, distributing authority on strictly geographical lines. For such reasons, a fairly flexible and general definition is
advisable, such as that suggested by the Canadian Gray Report:
[Tihe embodiment of foreign direct investment by a single business enterprise which straddles several economies (a minimum of four or five) and
divides its global activities between different countries with a view to
realising overall corporate objectives.'
To which one might add:
Generally speaking, the MNE may adopt the most beneficial business
form for transnational business operations, taking into account the relevant home country laws, host country laws, and international treaties.7
Should the reader feel predisposed towards more lengthy and exhaustive
definitions from the economic, political, legal and managerial viewpoints,
there is a wealth of such literature,' though its utility is elusive.

I.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

What concerns us most today about the MNEs is their power, actual
and potential, to control the destinies of millions of people to a degree
equal to and greater than the control historically exerted by national governments. In the past there has been a number of very powerful commercial enterprises but they were heavily reliant for their political and economic success on a single-nation state which almost used the corporation
as a means of governing a colony while extracting raw materials. Examples
of this would include the P&O Steam Packet Company, the British East
India Company and the Hudson Bay Company. The MNE is, however,
essentially untrammelled by service to a given state beyond the limited
3. The contractual approach is most often used in Europe, e.g., Unilever.
4. Hadari, Structure of the Private MultinationalEnterprise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 729, 75254 (1973).
5. Id. at 753.
6. FOREIGN DIRECr INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972) at 51, cited in Note, Canada's Changing

Posture Towards Multinational Corporations:An Attempt to Harmonise Nationalism with
Continued Industrial Growth, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. AND POL. 271, 273 (1974).
7.
8.

Hadari, supra note 4, at 760.
See, e.g., Hadari, supra note 4, at 746-66; Aharoni, On the Definition of the Multinational Corporation, 11 Q, REV. ECON. AND Bus. 27, 35 (1972), and sources cited therein.
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duties imposed upon it by the corporation laws. Its policies are its own,
and these may or may not coincide with the policies of the state of incorporation, siege social, or economic market. This is the new element introduced into the scene by the MNE-it is very powerful, it is politically
uncontrolled, and it is not accountable to any system of review.
Regardless of how accurate a linear projection premised upon current
growth rates may be, it is noteworthy that using such a method many have
concluded that the global system in the future will be dominated by 300
giant enterprises. Hymer and Barber are in agreement on this point,9 with
Barber going so far as to predict that by 1980 "three hundred. . . corporations will control 75 percent of the world's manufacturing assets."' 0 However, one does not need to engage in speculation about the future to perceive the power of the MNE. The giant, as the saying goes, is already in
our midst. If one equates power with sheer size and wealth, then the MNE
is already a force to be reckoned with. For example, Servan-Schreiber, who
is probably the man most responsible for directing attention to the problems associated with the MNE, pointed out in 1968 that the third largest
industrial power in the world after Russia and the United States is the
American corporation in Europe." American direct foreign investment,
which in 1946 totalled only $7.2 billion, burgeoned to $86 billion in 1971
and now exceeds $100 billion. This is a figure in excess of the combined
direct foreign investment of the rest of the world." Not only are the generic
sums vast, but the individual enterprises themselves produce some interesting statistics, such as the fact that General Motors' $25 billion annual
sales figure is greater than the gross national product of 130 nations."
Phillipps, based in the Netherlands, has affiliates in 68 countries, factories
in 39, and employs more than a quarter of a million people, 167,000 of
whom are employed outside of the home state. 4 Ford, which employs
388,000 (150,000 outside of the United States), comprises a network of 60
corporations, 40 of which are based outside of the United States. Thirtysix percent of Fords' $8 billion in total assets is invested in 27 foreign
countries."
The result of such wealth and power need not by any means be all bad,
9.

Hymer, The Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations,60

AMER.

ECON. REV. 441 (1970); BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION; ITS POWER, ITS MONEY, ITS

POLITICS (1970).

supra note 9,at 264.

10.

BARBER,

11.

J.J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERIcAN CHALLENGE 3 (1968).

12. Hadari, supra note 4, at 739. About one-third of U.S. exports of manufactured nonmilitary goods is shipped to overseas affiliates of U.S. corporations. Vernon, Economic Sovereignty at Bay, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 110, 119 (1968).
13. Vagts, The Host Country Faces the Multinational Enterprise, 53 BOSTON U.L. REV.
261, 262 (1973).
14. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise:A New Challenge for TransnationalLaw, 83
HARv. L. REv. 739, 750 (1970).
15. Id. at 749.
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but from the lawyer's perspective that possibility should not be rejected
out of hand. The main difficulty lies in the fact that the nation-state,
which is itself continually under attack for not serving the needs of the
people it was designed to serve, is the traditional decision maker in the
field of social, economic and fiscal policy; but it is now possible for the
nation-state's decision making power to be overruled or negated by a corporate decision made in another country. Even though a host nation has
at its command a whole battery of legal techniques for controlling foreign
investment, it cannot control the more important corporate decisions, such
as whether to remain in the market. The sudden withdrawal of foreign
investment from a state can severely upset the balance of trade and the
labor market. Since the MNE's identification of values is different from
that of the nation-state's, such possibilities, and lesser variants, are continuous. In short, the legal systems within which the MNE is operating are
not in any way coextensive with the enterprise. Thus any conclusion
reached by any of the legal systems will be based on interests and information less broad than those deemed relevant by or applicable to the enterprise. The enterprise, on the other hand, will take into account in its
decision making, factors which a host state would deem entirely irrelevant
or even disastrous. It is this gap between the purposes and functional
ambit of the two concepts that is causing all the trouble; agreement on the
goals of the separate legal systems and of the multinationals is well nigh
impossible. The corporation's desire to increase profits by means of manufacturing efficiency will clash with a government's desire to keep a plant
open for maximum employment; the corporation's ability to sell a product
to a customer will clash with the home government's desire to isolate that
customer for political or strategic reasons; the corporation's desire to minimize taxes will meet with a government's desire to maximize them, and
so forth. While the MNE has a fairly easily definable series of goalsmaximizing profit and efficiency-the sovereign states are in a much more
difficult position since internal politics, being the art of the possible,
usually produce only transient compromises between values that are in
conflict amongst themselves independent of the MNE. On this Vagts says:
What calculus could reduce to a single common mathematical denominator the interests (1) of the finance ministry in greater tax gathering from
greater national income, (2) of the same agency in a better foreign exchange status, (3) of the ministry of defence in a stronger industrial base
for the country's armaments, (4) of the ministry of foreign affairs in building closer ties with the country of the MNE's origin . . . and (5) the
ministry of economic affairs in showing a high per capita GNP?"6
Thus, it is difficult enough to elicit from one political system a decision
on what is, all things considered, the best thing to do; but if one attempts
16.

Id. at 757.

19761

THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

to cope with the vast differences in the political and economic philosophies
of sovereign nations and their approaches to foreign investment, the problem of harmonization of MNE goals and state goals becomes impossible
and thus useful legal control over MNEs becomes that much more out of
reach. Not only is the MNE out of phase with sovereign states but it is also
out of phase with international law. This is undoubtedly due to the fact
that international law is the product of sovereign consent and agreement,
both of which are lacking in this area-the latter for the above reasons and
the former because the control of corporations has been until recently
regarded as an exclusively domestic matter and thus not for international
consideration. Consequently there is no customary international law of any
substance on the topic of multinational corporations. This may or may not
be regrettable but it is an undeniable fact. As the International Court of
Justice wistfully remarked in the Barcelona Traction case:'
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the
growth of foreign investments and the expansion of the international activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which are
often multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that
the evolution of the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystalized on the international plane.'"
Thus there is no mechanism for pressing upon corporations the consideration of world-wide problems that are beyond even the reach of the nationstates, and the result is that in many important spheres of activity, the
MNE is subject to no external control in the traditional sense.
There are inherent problems in the operation of an MNE that might be
regarded as a limitation of sorts. For example, the very size of the enterprise and the complexity of its managerial structure and lines of communication may make central control on the basis of all available data very
difficult indeed. The vulnerability of these large organizations to bureaucratic myopia has been noted in passing by Professor Rubin. Citing the
Peter Principle as the probable cause, he reminds us of the blunders that
led to the collapse of the Pennsylvania Railroad and Intrabank.'9 Such
obvious situations as these might be few and far between, but the point
may nevertheless be a valid one, namely that the MNE, while in its purely
international affairs is beyond the reach of external controls, may well have
an internal structure that suffers from the same lacuna. Another very
important factor that might restrict their freedom to act is the interdependence of the various subsidiaries upon one another, especially when the
industry concerned has a central manufacturing source for key components, as is the case in the electronics and motor industries. Here it is
17.
18.
19.

Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), [19701 I.C.J. 3.
Id. at 34.
Rubin, The Multinational Enterpriseat Bay, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 476 (1974).
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possible for the stoppage of a single assembly line in one country to have
ramifications throughout the global operations of the parent enterprise.
This has been the experience of the Ford Motor Company in the labyrinthine realms of British labor relations. 0
Despite these problems, which inhere in all systems, the unusual power
and potential for good or ill of the MNE remains the key issue. Before
discussing the available means of controlling the MNE, it would be well
to assess briefly the arguments that are made in attacking and defending
the MNE's role in international affairs in order to be able to assess the
desirability or lack of it for magisterial supervision.
Those who advocate the cause of the MNE frequently advance the idea
of the world enterprise as a "good citizen" of every nation which enjoys its
presence."' The argument is that the corporation will realize that it is to
its best advantage to adhere to the laws, customs and values of the state
within which it operates. That may be so, but there are several problems
with the argument. First the identification of the laws, customs and values
of a nation is in the hands of an elite who may be less than objective in
their deliberations. Secondly, even assuming the good faith of the governmental order, one continually finds examples of corporate conduct that is
less than perfect. One need only mention the attempt by ITT to prevent
the election of the late Salvador Allende as President of Chile; 22 the allegations that oil companies in host nations drill wells to the wrong depths and
bulldoze operational wells in order to cope with a predicted glut in world
production and to improve their bargaining position with the host
government;2 3 the payoffs to cabinet ministers to forestall an inconvenient
change in a country's foreign investment law; 24 and the recent publicity
directed towards bribery of foreign officials by multinational oil companies. 5 Whether such activities are atypical and rare, as the boardrooms of
the world would have us believe, is very difficult to establish. The criminal
law of the United States has carved within it exceptions to the general
requirements of mens rea and actus reus designed in large part to circumvent the problems of proof and responsibility in dealing with the large
corporation.2 ' Even if one were to accept that the incidents of bribery and
20. Id.
21. The "good citizen" concept as it relates to MNEs is discussed more fully in Rubin,
The InternationalFirm and the National Jurisdiction,THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, A
SYMPOsIuM 201-04 (C.P. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
22. Nehemkis, SupranationalControl of the International Corporation: A Dissenting
View, 10 CALIF. W. L. REv. 286, 299 (1974); R.J. BARNET AND R.E. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH
81-83 (1974); Rubin, supra note 19, at 484.
23. Rubin, supra note 19, at 480.

24.

BARNET AND MULLER,

supra note 22, at 187.

25. The Senate subcommittee chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho) is providing
further variations on alleged malpractice by the MNE's almost daily.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922);
State v. Arizona Mines Supply Co., 107 Ariz. 199, 484 P.2d 619 (1971); United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed 492 (1943).
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corruption recently made public were exceptional cases, this does not
argue conclusively against some form of control. One could make the same
argument against the law prohibiting treason.
As far as international problems are concerned, the "good citizen" approach seems to be completely lacking. This is not to criticize the decision
makers of the MNEs, for it goes without saying that their goals need not
relate in any way to the needs of the planet. For example, there is the
ongoing problem of oil spillage and oil dumping at sea. There is no effective
supranational authority to enforce environmental norms, and consequently it is in an area like this that one can see the social responsibility
of the MNE in laboratory conditions. The Office of Technology Assessment
for the Senate Commerce Committee has concluded that the tanker fleets
of the world dump about one million tons of oil per annum into the oceans
intentionally. A further 450,000 tons is unintentionally leaked into the
sea.2" Using a linear projection, Jacques Cousteau has predicted that the
oceans will be dead in 25 years. 29 In response to such forebodings of doom,
the stock response is that the spillage will not continue at its present rate
and that there is no "proof" that harm is actually caused by such spillage.
Yet even if Commander Cousteau is wrong by a factor of four, this does
not substantially alter the picture, unless one is so utterly selfish and
myopic as to judge environmental problems solely on the basis of one's own
lifespan. As regards the matter of proof, since there is reason to believe that
the effect of oil on the surface of the oceans induces irreversible and potentially catastrophic changes in the food chain cycle, 29 it would only be prudent, as any efficacious legal system would, to shift the burden of proof to
the MNEs involved. Should the reader be in any doubt as to the inability
of the multinational enterprise to conduct itself with integrity in the absence of effective supranational control, the author recommends Noel Mosstert's book Supership as evidence to the contrary.'9
With regard to another argument supportive of the positive role of the
MNE, namely that such large corporations are innovative in technology
and consequently a boon to mankind, one must of course agree. But this
innovation in technology has been in response to its marketability and
demand (pre-existing or created) and, consequently, it should come as no
surprise that certain global problems might be ignored by a corporation
simply because solving the problem will in no way benefit the corporation.
In favor of the innovative role of the MNE one finds Vernon's data that
187 multinational firms dedicated 2.48% of their sales for research and
development, while the average for all American manufacturing enterprises amounted to only 1.29%.31 Against this proposition one may cite
27.
28.
29.
30.

Manchester Guardian Weekly, Oct. 11, 1975, at 18, col. 3.

31.

R.

Id.
N. MOSTERT,
Id.

SUPERSHIP

passim (1974).

VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY

8-9 (1971).
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Scherer's findings in a study of the relationship between the size of a
corporation and the number of patents issued to it wherein he found a
negative correlation, as did Watson and Holman.2 A final point should be
made in regard to the MNEs' "good citizenship" at the global level. Berg,
after analyzing the international food industry and its lack of concern with
the problems of poverty and starvation, concluded that
for all the technical ingenuity that has gone into the development of new
products, corporate technologists have not yet been able to come up with
a food that can be sold commercially for a profit and still be priced low
enough to reach and help the masses of people who need it most.3
In short, there is no profit in poverty and starvation. If these problems are
worthy of serious attention one cannot presume that MNEs will be responsive. They may indirectly benefit host nations by spreading technology,
thus permitting them to find solutions to their local problems, but the
effect may just as easily be to create a brain drain from the host country,
leaving a reduced capability to indulge in creative, goal-oriented research2 Other negative aspects of the exchange of technology might include the creation of pollution as an inevitable by-product, the subversion
of the local culture, the creation of unattainable expectations (especially
true in the communications industries) leading to possible civil strife, the
increase in the technology of warfare, and the creation of a technology elite
which widens the gap between rich and poor within the host nation.
More immediate than the above, in terms of cause and effect upon the
nation-state, is the MNEs' unparalled ability to move funds quickly from
one jurisdiction to another. Here the gap between the goals of the state and
the goals of the enterprise would seem to be a permanent one. Since there
are financial ties between the various legally distinct subsidiaries of an
MNE, it is possible to transfer funds between the various parts of the
enterprise almost as though there were no national jurisdictions at all. The
parent headquarters with its resources and communications equipment
can make a very informed guess as to which country is the best repository
for the company's money. The money may be moved to avoid an impending devaluation or to avoid higher taxes in many ways, but the most notorious is the manipulation of allocation of income by means of transfer
pricing. This is a technique whereby money may be moved from one arm
of the enterprise to another by means of setting a price, not on the basis
32. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented
Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1970); Watson and Holman, Concentration of Patents
from Government Financed Reseach in Industry, 49 REv. OF EcoN. AND STAT. 375 (1967).
33. Berg, Industry's Struggle with World Malnutrition, 50 HAiv. Bus. REV. 130, 134
(1972).
34. For an analysis of the relative merits of these arguments, see Pravitt, The Multinational Enterprise and the Transfer of Technology, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (J.
Dunning ed. 1971).
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of market demand but upon the basis of the goal to be attained by the
transaction. Thus an MNE might attempt to maximize worldwide aftertax profits by means of transferring its goods at artificially high prices into
subsidiaries that have relatively high taxes. It could be the case, as Hadari
and Nehemkis suggest, 35 that this type of operation is rare and its potential
for abuse overrated, but without effective review and control it is not even
possible to ascertain such basic facts. While the United States has adopted
the "arm's length" standard for dealing with such operations, 3' the majority of less developed nations, and probably even some of the more industrialized ones too, might not have the available manpower and capacity
to follow suit effectively, thus losing an untold amount of revenue in the
maze of multinational financial dealings. In view of the fact that "a
[single] company with 24 subsidiaries has approximately 3,000 potential
financial links," 37 the possibility of a solitary nation coping alone with the
problem is not very great.
In short, the entire problem of the MNE is almost impossible to discuss
empirically or rationally even before one gets to the point of deciding upon
the desirability of certain acts or activities at the national, regional or
supranational level. For example, there seem to be many factors that could
be seen as favorable to the MNEs' world role and just as many unfavorable. The obvious benefits are that MNEs improve the world's allocation
of resources to the mutual benefit of parent, host and other countries. To
this one might counter "[i]n terms of world economy, rationalization of
production may be beneficial, as presumably is the expansion of world
trade. . . . But is there a world economy?""8 If there is not, then the
benefits perceived at the global level by economists may be achieved at the
expense of losing potential benefits at the national level as perceived by
the political systems there. Thus, unless there is a world economy, and it
is perfectly apparent that there is not, then one cannot claim that global
benefits are necessarily a positive contribution to the scene by the MNE.
As far as benefit to the host country is concerned, the issue is likewise
cloudy. For example, a domestic politician interested in his state's achieving a higher standard of living might wish to emphasize the positive aspects, namely, that the foreign presence may generate nationalism which
is good for a state's economic progress and might even result in the creation
of locally owned corporations aimed at competing with the outsider. On
the other hand, it might reduce nationalism by showing the benefits of
internationalism (a plus in the international arena) which might in turn
lead to a better investment climate and increased foreign investment, all
at the expense of a less efficient local industry and the host country's
natural resources. On the issue of whether employment is created only in
35.
36.
37.
38.

Hadari, supra note 4, at 781; Nehemkis, supra note 22, at 803.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §482.

See remarks by Stobaugh in 66 PROC. OF AM. SOC'Y
Rubin, supra note 2, at 26.

OF INT'L

L. 14, 18 (1972).
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the host country and not in the home country, as most believe, one can
find evidence to the effect that the host country activity creates home
country employment indirectly, and that the host country jobs would not
have existed in the home country because of the vastly different economic
39
climate there, and other factors such as a minimum wage level..
To a lawyer, this uncertainty emphatically indicates the need for a rational system of controls so that the benefits may be emphasized and the
disadvantages ameliorated. The problem is made especially complex, however, since there are two major perspectives to be taken into account-the
international and the domestic. One may be able to advance backward
countries, 0 raise the gross international product, create a new international philosophy and rationalize industry, all of which are acceptable to
many as worthwhile achievements. But this may be done at the expense
of individual economies that will respond with suitable restrictions, as they
are entitled to do under current legal theory. The answer to the cost-benefit
calculus is almost inevitably different depending upon which perspective
one takes. Thus there is an inevitable, inescapable, tension between national jurisdictions and their solutions to the "threat" posed by MNEs
and international solutions. The latter are necessarily less likely to succeed
since consent is still the basis of international law,4 and their success thus
depends upon the nation-states. For this reason it is clear that the future
of the MNE is going to be controlled by the various states of the world
acting more or less unilaterally to protect their perceptions of their best
interests.2 Sovereignty is extremely unlikely to be surrendered to a supranational body that would have authority over anything as important to a
state as its economic system which is nowadays almost co-extensive with
national interests. In this context, one must accept the essential truth of
Dean Acheson's remark that "[t]he survival of states is not a matter of
law.' 3 We turn now to an assessment of the state-based and the international approaches to the control of the multinationals.
39. Stobaugh, U.S. MultinationalEnterprises and the U.S. Economy, 1 Studies on U.S.
Foreign Investment, 1 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1972). Here it was concluded, on the basis
of nine major foreign investments, that foreign investments created more jobs for U.S. workers than were eliminated.
40. This assumes that the Western industrial system constitutes an advance.
41. "The rules of law binding upon states . . . emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions. . . . [Riestrictions upon the independence of states therefore
cannot be presumed.
...Case of the S.S. LOTUS, [1927] C.I.J.J., ser. A, No. 9, 18.
"[Un case of doubt a limitation of sovereignty must be construed restrictively." The Free
Zones Case, [1930] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 22, 21.
42. These perceptions will of course be inferred from factual data on MNEs that will not
be complete due to the extent of the MNEs' activity outside of the jurisdiction of the host
state. Consequently these perceptions may be incorrect.
43. Remarks by the Hon. Dean Acheson, 1963 PROC. OF AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 13 (1963).
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II.

AVAILABLE LEGAL RESPONSES

Along the lines outlined above, it is often suggested that the only response to the problem of the multinational enterprise that should be made
is to allow the nation-states themselves to continue to cope with the problems they perceive by means of their own legislation. This view has been
put forward by many, among them Rubin" and Vagts,4" and in many ways
it is rational and workable. It is rational because the chances of supranational control are virtually nil, and it is workable because within their own
individual spheres of jurisdiction, each state is fully competent legally.
This full competence or sovereignty has not been undermined in the legal
sense as many would have us believe. 6 Without doubt there has been a
considerable loss of the political and economic freedom enjoyed by some
states due to the "creativity" and massive resources of the MNEs, but
legally the power to act is unscathed and can only be lost with the consent
of the state. It is of great importance to a useful discussion of the problem
to make such a distinction and it is one which is all too seldom made by
writers who confuse bargaining strength and political muscle with legal
capacity. The legal capacity remains though the state may not make full
use of it for other, extra-legal, reasons. Consequently, the states involved
with MNEs have at their disposal the entire range of techniques that have
been developed for controlling international trade and investment. If each
state were to identify its own goals and legislate accordingly then, it is
argued, there might appear a broadly acceptable system-if international
laissez-faire is acceptable.
The home or host nation might encourage or discourage the operation
of an enterprise by means of various devices of its own choosing such as:
quotas on imports or exports (perhaps proportional to domestic
production); limits on the exportation or repatriation of capital; encouragement of repatriation of profits, incentives and disincentives to invest
abroad; enforcing vigorously or soft-pedalling diplomatic protection for
foreign expropriation, nationalization, disinvestment; the manipulation of
taxation of foreign income; customs duties on the importation of raw materials; restrictions on the amounts and forms of foreign borrowing; mandatory profit-sharing; or the direction of foreign investment into joint ventures. Another less sophisticated approach is the selective screening of
foreign businesses which wish to enter the economy, as is done in Japan,
44.
45.
46.

Rubin, supra note 21, at 179.
Vagts, supra note 14, at 786.
On the undermining of sovereignty by MNEs a representative list would include: The
MULTINATIONAL FIRM AND THE NATION STATE (G. Paquet ed. 1972); R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY
AT BAY (1971); Baum, The Global Corporation:An American Challenge to the Nation-State,
55 IOWA L. REV. 410 (1969); Miller, The Multinational Corporationand the Nation State, J.
WORLD TRADE L. 269 (1973).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

France and Canada. In terms of legislating in order to regain control of key
industries and natural resources, Canada provides a most instructive
47
example.
Again, all of the above techniques, and many more, are within the reach
of any sovereign state that wishes to attempt to extract the maximum
benefit from the MNE at the least expense. Most nations do not indulge
in the entire list of possibilities, but if they wished to they need look no
further for hints on how to do it than the United States, which as world
leader in free trade, is oddly enough a mine of information on methods of
controlling, limiting or stopping such trade. For example, without any
attempt at being exhaustive, there is the Export Control Act,48 the Buy
America Act, 9 the Trading and the Enemy Act,50 the Sherman Act, 5' and
a whole host of regulations on a variety of topics, often with extraterritorial
effect. Indeed so thorough is the United States' approach to the control of
the MNE that Professor Vagts" has suggested that if there is to be a
rational attempt at dealing with the MNE, in the light of current realities,
it is for the United States to control it,51 and this responsibility must be
squarely faced. While this might be a rational, and perhaps even a successful approach to the problem, it is unlikely to meet with the approval and
consent of the other nations of the world who may be less than eager to
adopt as theirs the conclusions of the United States government on: the
global allocation of benefits and resources, the identification of goals, the
means to be adopted, and the expenses that might reasonably be incurred
in achieving these goals. Since most of the domestic political outcry in host
states against the multinationals is due simply to the fact that they are
controlled from the United States5 and are seen as imperialistic threats
to the host state's economy, culture and natural resources, the suggestion
that the United States would perhaps be the best repository for magisterial
control is a trifle unrealistic. But it is only fair to point out that this
possible conflict of interest has occurred to Professor Vagts also, for he
says:
This delicate feat will involve, first a willingness both to share and provide
in a useful form the data which we are increasingly extracting from
MNE's. It also will involve a willingness to explain to them the purposes
and effects of our measures and to consider their views. 55
47.

See Note, supra note 6, at 282-83, and sources cited therein.

48.
49.

50 U.S.C.A. App §2021 et seq. (Rev. 1964).
50 U.S.C.A. App §5(b) (Rev. 1964).

50. 41 U.S.C.A. §10(a) (Rev. 1964).
51. 15 U.S.C.A. §§1-2 (Rev. 1964).
52. Vagts, supra note 14.
53. Id. at 786.
54. Rubin, supra note 21, at 182-90, and see tables 1 and 2 in appendix to Angelo,
Multinational Corporate Enterprises in 125 REC. DES CouRs 441, 584-88 (vol. I1 1968).
55. Vagts, supra note 14, at 787.
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Despite the feasibility of leaving the individual nation-states to regulate
the multinationals within their own territory, an obvious problem arises
when one again brings into play the fact that a multinational's goals,
operations and effects are supranational and the territorial jurisdiction of
a single state is not a fit base for controlling the entire entity. Thus this
approach is severely limited in that it cannot guarantee the control necessary to ensure that the MNE is a global "good citizen" since its effectiveness has very real geographical boundaries. A state cannot be certain by
any means that the judgments of its courts will be enforced abroad in the
country where the financial seat of the enterprise is found. Nor does a state
have within its grasp all of the information on the mechanics, resources
and policies of an MNE that it might need in order to make effective policy
decisions on how to regulate it. Furthermore, there is the inevitable problem that the activities of a foreign arm of an MNE, or of the global MNE
itself, which are wholly beyond the traditional territorial jurisdiction,
might either endanger national security or else have a real and substantial
effect on the internal economic situation that is exactly opposite to governmental policy. The emerging answer to all of these questions is extraterritoriality.
Before commenting on the possible success of extraterritoriality as a
means of economic problem solving, it would be well to indicate precisely
how far along that path we have gone and how states have responded to
it. The most notable example is of course the extraterritorial application
of the United States' antitrust legislation dating from 1945. In that year
the Alcoa case held with great clarity that "it is settled law . . . that any
state may impose liabilities even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
that the state reprehends." 5 1This, in turn, was modified slightly and ensconced in section 18 of the Second Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States which provides that
a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory if. ..the effect within the territory is substantial,...
it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory . and the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognised by states that have reasonably developed legal systems. 7
Regardless of the fact that it was not "settled law" in 1945 that a state
could impose such liabilities for any conduct, and regardless of the fact
that the last requirement of section 18, if taken seriously, might negate the
validity of the entire section, this rule has been consistently adopted with
56. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1965).
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minor variations. The problem with Alcoa and section 18 is quite simply
that it is almost limitless in terms of the behavior that it encompasses;
even the limitation "substantial" in section 18 is aimed not at behavior in
the foreign country but at the effect within the United States. Much of the
blame for this can be traced back to the fact that the "settled law" in Alcoa
was an international rule laid down in a case involving tangible harm at a
time when the possible extension of the rule to its present wide limits was
almost certainly unforeseeable due to the smaller volume of international
trade and the lack of a significant MNE problem. It is just as unwise to
take a rule from the past and inject it into the present without further
consideration in international law as it is in domestic law. Indeed it is
much more so due to the fact that the jurisprudence of the World Court is
progressing in a piecemeal manner. There being very few cases, there are
no areas with highly developed sets of rules which have suitable exceptions
and definitions for all eventualities. This problem was foreseen in the
drafting of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which clearly
abolishes the simplistic Western-based notion of stare decisis: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
'
respect of that particular case." 58
Despite this, the "rule" of the Case of
the S.S. LOTUS" has become part of the law of the United States.
The Case of the S.S. LOTUS involved the application of the objective
territorial principle in the context of a collision at sea. The effects of this
event which provided the basis for jurisdiction were both tangible and
limited to a finite set of facts. Alcoa and its progeny, on the other hand,
use that approach where the effects are not tangible and may indeed be
entirely conceptual; nor do they have inherent limits like those in the S.S.
LOTUS case. Furthermore the Case of the S.S. LOTUS involved a determination of concurrent jurisdiction on the high seas, a res nullius, rather
than competing claims within the territory of another interested state, as
is the case in Alcoa situations. This extraterritorial jurisdiction has been
subject to much criticism, with its critics maintaining that it flies in the
face of sovereignty, reciprocity and the equality of states, and that it has
shown itself to be unworkable in practice.
The futility of the approach was made manifest in the ICI-Dupont-BNS
cases in the 1950's.10 There the English Courts predictably refused to enforce an order issued by the District Court for the Southern District of New
York that a British company should grant exclusive patent licences to
another British company. Later in United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Centre,' the same court issued an order attempting to regulate concerted anticompetitive conduct taking place inside
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 59.
59. The Case of the S.S. LOTUS, [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, 10.
60. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indust. Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. [1955] 1 Ch. 37.
61. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centre, 133 F. Supp. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).

58.
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Switzerland entirely in conformity with Swiss law. This order was rejected
by the Swiss government in no uncertain manner. In that case the objective approach was reiterated:
[A] United States Court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and
contracts, if, as in the case at bar, such acts and contracts have a substan2
tial and material effect upon our foreign and domestic commerce'
The United States courts, as the courts of any other country in the world,
may do so, but the more important question is whether anything happens
as a result. Such failures inevitably raise questions as to the accuracy of
Learned Hand's conclusion that what he was embarking upon was indeed
"settled law."
It should be noted here that this new approach to jurisdiction, which
cannot be said to be the subject of any permissive rule of international law,
has been adopted elsewhere and every day looks less and less like an
aberration. For example, the Commission of the European Economic Community in 1969 fined British and Swiss corporations (both then outside of
the EEC) for price fixing activities which affected trade within the Common Market. It held that "the rules of competition of the treaty . . . are
applicable to all restrictions of competition that produce within the Common Market effects to which Article 85, paragraph 1, applies."'" Later, in
a similar vein, the corporate veil was lifted in the Commercial Solvents
case 4 in order to establish that an Italian corporation, l'Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano, was controlled by a United States corporation, Commercial Solvents. On the basis of that control (which incidentally seems
to have been more financial than real) the Commission concluded that
"there is no ground for distinguishing between the will and the acts of the
Commercial Solvents Corp. and those of Instituto Chemioterapico."' 5 Consequently the entire entity, and not just that branch of it which operated
within the EEC, was fined for abuse of dominant market position in violation of article 86 of the Treaty of Rome."
While the possible jurisdictional conflicts with regard to the extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws are potentially negotiable,' there do
62. Id. at 45.
63. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9314, at 8694 (1969).
64. Laboratorio Chimico Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja Sp A v. Commercial Solvents Corp.
and Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D50 (1973).
65. Id. at D57.
66. For a full analysis and proposals concerning the increasing use of the technique of veil
lifting in the EEC, see Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational:Lifting
the Veil in the EEC and the U.S., 6 L. AND POL. INT'L Bus. 375 (1974). It should be noted
that this technique results in the same enforcement problems in many cases as does extraterritoriality.
67. For example, the Antitrust Notification and Consultative Procedure between the
United States and Canada (Nov. 3, 1969), reproduced in 8 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1305 (1969). This
agreement provides that each country in enforcing its antitrust laws will consult with the
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remain substantial areas in the international trade activities of the multinationals which are likely to conflict with high-priority policies of a state.
In areas such as this the possibility of successful negotiation, which was
never very high, evaporates completely. As with the abortive attempts at
antitrust enforcement above, the United States has attempted to enforce
such domestic norms extraterritorially. As with the antitrust cases, the
degree of success is minimal. One might be moved to argue that although
enforcement is not in fact possible, there is still a salutary effect in the
attempt, but this is to confuse legal mechanisms with extra-legal
mechanisms; law with politics. In any event there seems to be no effective
counter to the possibility of legislation appearing in potential target states
forbidding compliance with foreign court judgments that might adversely
effect the policies adopted by the target state government. 8
Perhaps the most famous example of extraterritoriality outside of the
antitrust area involving state interests that are potentially of a very high
order is the Fruehauf-Francecase.6" Here a French corporation, which was
two-thirds owned by a United States corporation, contracted with another
French corporation, Berliet, to sell equipment designed to be put on trucks
destined for the Peoples Republic of China. In response to this, the U.S.
Treasury Department, charged with the administration of the Trading
with the Enemy Act, ordered the parent corporation not to execute the
contract as it violated U.S. law. The parent company attempted to comply, but the directors of the French corporation sued the U.S. corporation
in France. The upshot of this was that the French court appointed a temr
porary administrator to enable the contract to be executed. The Treasury
Department, on seeing the complete inability of the American corporation
to control the events in France, rescinded its order.
The above case is interesting for many reasons. It shows that there is
more than a grain of truth in the nationalistic accusations in host countries
that U.S.-based MNEs are being used as tools for the exportation of U.S.
values and policies, and that the "problem" of the MNE is, in some cases,
to be found not in the corporation, but in the government of the incorporating state. It shows that the "problem" of the MNE in current world trade
is a two-way street in that while the MNE causes many problems for
states, it is possible for the reverse to be true with an impossible strain
being put on an entity spanning competing jurisdictions which apply mutually inconsistent norms. But most of all, for our present purposes, it
shows yet again that the extraterritorial application of its norms by a state
is not the answer to the problems presented by the MNEs since there is
an inevitable reliance on the host state's being willing to respond positively
other when its interests are potentially affected. The effectiveness of this procedure is curtailed somewhat by the United States' insistence on the right to unilateral action.
68. See proposed Canadian legislation to this end in Note, supra note 6, at 300-02.
69. Soci6teb Fruehauf v. Massady, [1968] D.S. JUR. 147, [1965] J.C.P. II 14, 274 his
(Cour d'appel, Paris). For an analysis, see Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act-Foreign CorporationsOwned by Americans, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579 (1970).
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to the request or order of the home state, and an almost equally inevitable
unwillingness to do so. One state has to give in. Calling this "mutual
deference" is only a euphemism for that fact. In a system of sovereign,
legally equal states, extraterritoriality means only one thing-friction.
The mere fact that we have not yet seen a full blown contretemps in the
few years in which this approach has been tried does not mean that conflict
is avoidable or unlikely. It does not prove that it can all be worked out
somehow.
The friction and unworkability of the above approach may yet in the
eyes of some commentators bring about some type of progress. Indeed,
some optimists have seen in this unworkability the seeds of a new approach
to the allocation of competing jurisdiction in the economic area. Rubin, for
example, maintains that this friction leads to steps being taken on the part
of governments to reach accomodation and agreement.70 As examples, he
cites the good offices of the Restrictive Business Practices Committee of
the OECD and the United States-Canadian consultative procedure. He
goes on to say that
[o]ne may argue that as multinationalism increases, as technology is
licensed across national frontiers, the chances of conflict on policies toward restrictive business practices will increase. My own evaluation is
that national policies in this area are being increasingly harmonized. 7
Even if his evaluation were correct, this would still not fill the gap left by
the lack of an effective supranational jurisdiction. It fails to do so because
it relies upon states being willing to negotiate and consult which is in turn
dependent upon extra-legal factors. For example, the substance of disputes
involved in extraterritorial enforcement attempts such as antitrust, licensing, securities regulation and so forth, may be from the political viewpoint
unimportant and negotiable. On the other hand they may not, in which
case the standoff between the competing norms becomes subject to extralegal considerations. Harmonization is a fine theory when things are going
well, but law is put to the test when things are not going well.
Even between two countries with the closest cultural and economic ties
like the United States and Canada, one cannot be assured of harmony in
such a politically low-key issue as antitrust enforcement. There the United
72
States reserved the right to act unilaterally subsequent to negotiations
and Canada is in the process of legislating to protect itself from United
States intervention via extraterritoriality." It takes little imagination to
guess how successful the accomodation and harmonization approach is
likely to be in connection with countries that are less close on issues that
have a higher political content.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Rubin, supra note 2, at 14.
Id.
See Antitrust Notification Procedure, supra note 67.
See proposed Canadian legislation to this end in Note, supra note 6, at 300-02.
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In regard to Rubin's view that the substantive laws of the various nations
are approaching harmony imperceptibly, one can only respond that on the
basis of available information this does not appear to be the case. Even in
the EEC, the much vaunted avatar of mutual self-interest and shared
goals, an attempt to produce a regional company law has met with little
success.7 4 Likewise, the fact that such culturally similar countries as the
United States, Canada, Britain, France and Germany have produced legal
systems capable of producing inconsistent, even diametrically opposed
norms, tends to detract from the harmonization thesis. Furthermore, there
is always the possibility that the dissimilarity of substantive rules may
serve a symbolic role as representing national identity, a factor which
always figures largely when MNEs are involved. If this is the case, then
lack of harmony is almost guaranteed.
In relation to the Fruehauf case, Rubin says that it is "not a precursor
of important difficulties for the transnational march of business""5 because
"[a]gainst the total volume of trade handled by multinational enterprises, that part which could be affected by restraints policies, no matter
how Draconic, is tiny."76 This is simply to say that because the substantive
law is either unenforceable or unenforced, there is really no problem, hence
harmony. One cannot substitute optimism for practicality.
An interesting parallel development has been the Canadian response to
the possibility of large-scale oil pollution in her northern waters." The
Canadian Parliament adopted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act 8 in 1970 at a time when it was thought that oil from Alaska's north
slope would be brought to the eastern seaboard by means of a northwest
passage. The legislation is quite blunt in its effect. It extends Canadian
control over shipping to 100 nautical miles, well beyond what might be
claimed on a contiguous or archipelagic basis. This control includes the
right to refuse entry to shipping and the right to destroy or remove ships
in distress which are polluting the sea. This is of course a unilateral approach to an international problem, conceptually similar to the variants
of extraterritoriality practiced in the U.S. and in the EEC. A similar extension into the high seas has been made by most of the nations of South
America for the same basic reason-conservation. But this approach is
somewhat different from the Alcoa type of extraterritoriality in that it does
not directly challenge the sovereignty of another state on its home soil.
Here the conflict of jurisdiction is between the claiming state and, in
theory, all other states since the high seas are supposedly not subject to
expropriation. Thus, the likelihood of friction should be much less since
one is essentially substituting control for no control at all. Lest there be
74. See Angelo, supra note 54, at 557.
75. Rubin, supra note 2, at 16.
76. Id. at 16-17.
77. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the
Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1970).
78. 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47, at 653 (1970).
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any doubt as to the consistency of the position taken by the United States
with regard to extraterritoriality (and consistency is one of the primary
attributes of legality), one need only read the United States' response to
the Canadian legislation and to that same government's recently expanded
fisheries closing lines:
The United States deeply regrets this action. The United States regards
this unilateral act as totally without foundation in international law. The
United States firmly opposes such unilateral extensions of jurisdiction and
believes that outstanding issues concerning the oceans can only be resolved by effective international action."
This indicates quite clearly that the extraterritorial approach to global
problems is based on politics and not on law. Such being the case, it cannot
serve as a useful agent for controlling the multinational enterprise or any
other global problem. It is subject to ad hoc considerations which deny it
the generality of application that is necessary for a legal approach to any
problem.
We now turn to what the United States referred to above as "effective
international action," for if it is true that the larger problems caused by
the MNE are beyond the reach of the individual states affected, then one
must look to supranational and international mechanisms for effective
control. It is readily conceded that a great deal of regulation is possible at
the national level, but this is directed solely at national problems.
In approaching the international side of the problem posed by the
MNEs, one has to be constantly on the lookout for the line of argument
that we can achieve world peace by way of world trade. This simplistic
argument seems to appear almost everywhere in various guises .0 It is notable in that it locates the cart well in advance of the horse. The fact of the
matter is that we have world trade as a result of world peace, not the other
way around. World trade is not determinative of whether we have world
peace. Should there be any doubt about this, one should consider the fact
that in the years preceding World War I
most of the great powers of the world were also great traders; economically
they were closely tied together. In the years preceding World War I, for
example, Germany was Britain's second-best customer, both as a source
of imports and as a market for exports. Measured in terms of their own
economics, the two greatest powers in the
world today trade little with
81
each other or with the rest of the world.
79. United States Statement on Canadian Fisheries Closing Lines Announcement, Dec.
18, 1970, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 388 (1971).
80. For a messianic view of MNEs, see Hopkins, Money, Monopoly and the Contemporary World Order, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. AND POL. 63 (1972), and Salter, Dynamics of the
Multi-National Enterprise:Exemplar for World Government?, 8 INT'L LAWYER 11 (1974).
81. Waltz, The Myth of National Interdependence, THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, A
SyMposiuM 208 (C.P. Kindleberger ed. 1970).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Waltz goes on to point out that only true interdependence can raise the
threshold at which nations might be tempted to resort to force. Trade per
se, which includes trade in luxuries and non-essentials, is thus much too
broad a category on which to place one's hopes for the future. Finally, even
the argument that trade between states in necessary commodities will lead
to world peace is suspect since it assumes that the nations of the world act
rationally.
The need for a viable system of international control over the MNE has
already been alluded to. It arises because the MNE simply does not fit into
the current legal pastiche of sovereign states. The MNE has goals with
global effects based on a global calculus. It can -,,ay off one state against
another, circumvent local laws and ignore any relevant rules of international law (which is still firmly based on the nation-state). It can wreak
havoc on the economics of small states and undermine the policies of large
states. The role of the MNE in global pollution is clear and its ethics
frequently questionable. Yet, as has been pointed out by Barnes, citing the
Gray Report, "[blilateral and multilateral efforts 'have not been particularly far-reaching and conflicts over extraterritoriality and economic activity are likely to grow.' "8 The reasons for this pessimistic outlook are clear
enough. The various nations of the world have varying and conflicting
interests which make agreement at all but the most superficial level highly
unlikely. A home state's interests are necessarily different from a host
state's. A less developed country seeks benefits that differ from those
sought by a developing country and both of these differ from the benefits
sought by a highly industrialized nation. Socialist economies see problems
in a manner in which capitalist ones do not. Nationalistic responses to
foreign investment can preclude a rational program of sharing benefits and
negotiating. The list is almost indefinite. In light of this, truly effective
supranational control by way of custom, treaty or international organization must be accepted as being a long way off.
Despite the above, there have been some suggestions put forward by
commentators which entail a certain amount of international co-operation.
While the writer feels that they are all subject to the above problems, they
are nonetheless worth a brief analysis.
The most idealistic proposal is that of George W. Ball. 3 His proposal
envisions a multilateral treaty setting up an international companies law
administered by a supranational authority. While few would deny the
desirability of such a program, there can be no doubt that the attempt
would fall victim to the old rule of multilateral treaties, namely that the
instrument is either too superficial to cope with the problem or too detailed
to be adopted.
This problem of achieving agreement is not seen as being particularly
82. Barnes, Multilaw, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 313 (1973).
83. Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 1967
(Nov.-Dec. 1967).
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insurmountable by Goldberg and Kindleberger"4 who propose a GATT for
investment. On the question of agreement they say:
The ensuing actions [of MNEs] are regarded as detrimental by at least
one of the parties involved, and are perceived as conflicts of government
policies even though they stem from private corporate decisions. Fortunately, the conflicts are serious in only those handful of areas which we have
discussed: taxation, antitrust policy, foreign exchange and export controls
and securities regulation. Because these conflicts are universally accepted
as posing a problem for solution, the authors are optimistic that meaningful progress towards multiparty disputes can be made in the near future."
The authors go on to suggest that success might be possible by way of a
general agreement for the international corporation "similar to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,"8' 6 but nowhere do they explain why the
structural similarity to GATT is more likely to bring about agreement,
except for the hope that "[i]f it succeeded in acquiring a reputation for
thorough analysis and impartiality, the agency would in due course be able
to have its decisions accepted voluntarily by participants." 7 In any event,
their basic assumption that the universal acceptance of a problem as such
will lead to its solution must be gauged against the continuing inability of
the United Nations to agree on a definition of aggression, and the inability
of the members of that Organization to act responsibly in their efforts to
achieve a semblance of world order without resort to force. Finally, "Professor Kindleberger concedes that the Afro-Asian countries and Latin
America will not participate in a supranational body. . . .He therefore
advocates an international authority whose writ will run only among the
'8 8
industrialised countries-where it is least needed.
The natural response of the international lawyer when faced with global
problems that are not solvable in the foreseeable future has been of late to
investigate whether a regional approach might be more successful. Here we
are at an advantage since there have been two clear attempts at coping
with some of the problems of the MNE at a regional level-the EEC's
proposed European Company 9 and the Andean Foreign Investment
Code.8 0 These two regional responses provide a close look at the feasibility
of agreement between nations which have much in common.
As a result of the failure to achieve harmonization of national company
law and agreement on specific corporate problems, the French Government
took the initiative of proposing to the EEC Council in 1965 that a study
84.
sion of
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Goldberg and Kindleberger, Toward a GA TT for Investment: A Proposalfor Supervithe International Corporation,2 L. AND POL. INT'L Bus. 295 (1970).
Id. at 321-22.
Id.
Id. at 323.
Nehemkis, supra note 22, at 320.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9025 (1965).
11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 126 (1972).
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be undertaken with a view to setting up a European Commercial Company" The result has shown all but the most avid regionalist that even
among economically interdependent nations with great cultural and legal
similarity, agreement is still tantalizingly out of reach. As one informed
writer put it, "[v]irtually every important aspect of the proposal has been
the subject of difference,"" including such topics as: the method of establishing the company, the substantive antitrust rules to be applied, the
allocation of taxes, the question of "access" to the European Company
(i.e., what factors should determine whether an entity would qualify),
labor representation, and corporate disclosure laws. Ironically, while the
MNE was the cause of the attempt, at unification it is in the eyes of some,
also the cause of the failure of the attempt. On this Hadari states:
Many of the problems underlying the European company proposal are
directly attributable to the emergence of the MNE. The focus of the
proposal on the economic realities of modern commercial business, with
its disregard of the nation state corporate form, is a particularly noteworthy development. 3
The Andean Foreign Investment Code (AFIC) in theory goes much farther than the EEC's response to the problems created by MNEs. It was
initiated as a regional policy in 1969 and approved by the six members of
the Andean Subregional Group" in 1970. The approach taken in it is to
set up a timetable for disinvestment of foreign owned operations and to
limit the entry of new foreign investments.9 5 Since the countries to which
it applies all seem to have much in common and are geographically
grouped together (the two main conditions of regionalism), one might expect a modicum of success. Again that has not been the case, and again
the reason is that individual nation-states differ as to their needs no matter
91. For a detailed analysis of the proposal for a European Corporation see Mann, The
European Company, 19 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 468 (1970); Scholten, The European Company,
5 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 9 (1967); Note, Merger Movements in tHe Common Market, 10 VA. J.
INT'L L. 119 (1969).
92. Angelo, supra note 54, at 557.
93. Hadari, supra note 4, at 801-02.
94. Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
95. The Code's provisions are usefully summarized by Oliver who states that it
(I) classifies equity (or ownership) investment in accordance with its degree of
foreignness; (II) imposes prior restraints upon the entry of new direct foreign investments; (III) requires disinvestment by existing foreign elements down to minority
levels, on pain of denial of the benefits of free movement of goods and services
within a common market; (IV) closes certain sectors to foreign investment; (V)
regulates repatriation of invested capital and the remittance of profits; (VI) limits
the present opportunities of technology owner-transferors through patents, trademarks and know-how to benefit collaterally from their industrial property rights;
(VII) makes or anticipates some important changes in corporation and tax law.
Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Orderas to Direct ForeignInvestment, 66 AM. J. INT'LL. 763, 767-68 (1972).

19'761

THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE

how similar they may appear to be on the surface.
The result has been that only Peru and Venezuela have implemented
most of the AFIC's provisions. The other four countries have failed to live
up to the flexible standards in varying degrees. The Code contains
loopholes and exceptions, and the end result has been variations between
the national legislation implementing its provisions and the Code itself."6
Not only has the resulting treatment not been uniform but there is no
supranational authority to correct any such problems as have arisen. In an
excellent study of the AFIC, Fouts97 points out that Columbia and Chile
have been guilty of delaying its implementation, the former by two and a
half years due to a constitutional problem. Chile actually enacted legislation after the fall of the Allende regime which completely ignored the Code,
and this led to a resolution being passed by the other five members to the
effect that the Chilean decrees were in violation of the Code. 8 Bolivia and
Ecuador, the most undeveloped of the six, have failed to live up to the very
gradual implementation procedure drafted for them on the ground that
they would not be able to attract any new investment. Indeed, Fouts concludes that they are just not enforcing it."9 Her conclusion on the implementation of the Code itself is no less encouraging:
The regional policy on foreign investment called for in the Agreement of
Cartagena in 1969 has been, in practice, less a regional policy than a set
of standards which individual Andean Group countries have sought to
apply or modify in a manner consistent with what they judged to be their
own national priorities in the area of foreign investment.' ®
Finally, a brief word should be given on the role of customary international law and the position recently taken by the International Court of
Justice in Barcelona Traction.' Barcelona Traction was a Canadian corporation with Spanish and Canadian subsidiaries. After World War I, 88%
of the company's net value was owed to Belgian interests. In 1948 the
Spanish courts declared the company bankrupt and ordered the seizure
and sale of its Spanish assets. Canada, the nation of incorporation, gave
up diplomatic representation of the company in the 1950's. Belgium, whose
nationals suffered the most financial loss, sued Spain. Spain argued that
Belgium had no standing to sue. The court sustained Spain's objection.
This case is of great interest because it provided an opportunity for the
ICJ to adopt a creative role in the supervision of MNEs by emphasizing
not the traditional element of nationality as a basis for suit, but a more
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

For a summary of these variations, see Oliver, supra note 95, at 766 n.14.
Fouts, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 10 TExAs INT'L. L.J. 537 (1975).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 541-43.
Id. at 559.
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dynamic assessment of the realities of the situation. Opting for the former,
the court stated:
Evidence that damage was suffered does not ipso facto justify a diplomatic
claim. Persons suffer damage or harm in most varied circumstances. This
in itself does not involve the obligation to make reparation. 2
The adoption of such a strict approach, denying to the Belgian shareholders any remedy in international law, has been subject to severe criticism by the more unreflective writers in the field.' 3 But the court was
really unable to do anything else for several reasons. First among these is
the fact that the ICJ is very limited in its jurisdiction, relying on the
consent of both parties before it can become operational.""' Consequently,
if the court were to indulge in judicial law-making to the extent that a
domestic tribunal might, it would simply lose customers since uncertainty
of result would adversely affect the decision to submit to the court's jurisdiction. The court cannot indulge in a freewheeling, teleological approach
to the world's problems without jeopardizing its own effectiveness. Secondly, the protection of shareholders' interests at the international level
would raise more questions than it would answer.
The Court considers that the adoption of the theory of diplomatic protection of shareholders as such, by opening the door to competing diplomatic
claims, could create an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in intemational economic relations. The danger would be all the greater inasmuch
as the shares of companies whose activity is international are widely scattered and frequently change hands.' 0
Finally, there is the problem earlier alluded to, namely that there simply
is not a developing customary international law in the area of economic
and corporate regulation. That being the case, it would be not only unwise,
but impossible for the World Court to embark upon the route of international supervision. If there is no substantial agreement on the international
standard concerning expropriation, then there is no chance of agreement
on diplomatic representation of shareholder's rights. The World Court has
a very difficult role to play in developing areas of law. By its restraint in
this case it is removing itself from a very contentious area, thus protecting
its primary asset-its neutrality. It is to be commended in the long run for
doing so, even though the immediate result might be interpreted as unfortunate.
102. Id. at 36.
103. See, e.g., Caflish, The Protection of CorporateInvestments Abroad in the Light of
the Barcelona Traction Case, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AusLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
V45LKERRECHT 162 (1971); Note, Economic Internationalismvs. National Parochialism:Barcelona Traction, 3 L. AND POL. INT'L Bus. 542 (1971).
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III.

CONCLUSION

It is becoming clear that the economy of a nation is so central a part of
that amorphous concept, "sovereignty," that useful international regulatory activity in the economic and corporate fields is extremely unlikely.
The problem is not so much caused by the existence of the multinational
enterprises, as by the existence of the nation-state, a unit that is inevitably
smaller in scope than most of the pressing problems it has to deal with.
While the multinational enterprise is just one more example of the nationstate's inability to control the larger issues facing us, it also has the effect
of increasing nationalism by way of a xenophobic response to the foreign
origins of the enterprise. This means that rather than undermining sovereignty, as many believe, the MNE often has the effect of strengthening it.
We have seen that a nation may exert considerable control over an MNE
either as host or home state but that this control is limited to the territorial
jurisdiction. Consequently, it is often the case that the decision-making
apparatus which the state wishes to influence is beyond its reach. As a
response to this problem some states have adopted an extraterritorial philosophy. This has met with little or no success and what success there
might be is a product of political co-operation and not of legal validity.
Extraterritoriality is unlikely to solve the larger problems presented by the
MNE simply because it relies for its effectiveness upon co-operation from
the target state, something that in most situations is scarcely likely.
Regional responses, while initially more encouraging, have been reduced
to argument about the substantive law to be applied or else have been
inconsistently applied, again because of differences in the perceived needs
of individual states. While it may be too early to dismiss the European
effort towards a supranational company law, one would be wise to ask
whether any resulting agreement could survive a marked change in the
economic or political balance in Europe.
International law has an even more insignificant role to play since the
differences between states at the international level are even greater than
those at the regional level. For a single legal system to straddle these
differences, yet still be specific enough to exert enough control to direct
behavior towards global goals, is not possible. In regard to emerging areas
of law where custom figures largely as a source, the International Court of
Justice perceived that it could not adopt a prescriptive stance and must
instead adopt a descriptive one. Since the nation-states of the world have
not behaved with any unanimity, the court adopted a positivistic and
predictable position. It could not do otherwise. The result is that the sovereign units of the world must reach agreement by themselves.
Thus the larger objectives and effects of which the MNE is capable are
106.
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really beyond the reach of all but the legal systems of individual states.
This is not a satisfactory conclusion but any other answer would require a
considerable surrender of economic sovereignty by the nation-states and
this they are not likely to do in the foreseeable future. Consequently a
regime of legal laissez-faire is all that one can put forward as a means of
controlling the multinational enterprise in its global activities. De maximis
non curat lex.

